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Abandonment of Children As a Civil Wrong:
Burnette v. Wahl
Our society has historically treated abandonment, along with other
forms of child abuse or neglect, as a criminal matter. Legislatures have
imposed criminal sanctions on parents who abandon their children,' and
have provided administrative procedures by which children can be
removed from their natural family, if necessary, and placed in a foster or
adoptive home.2 Despite the unquestionable damage to children caused by
abandonment,3 no American legislature or court has ever allowed a child
to recover in tort for such damage. In the recent case of Burnette v. Wahl,
4
the Oregon Supreme Court maintained this unanimity by refusing to
recognize a civil action based on abandonment.
This Case Comment will analyze Burnette and the argument for
treatment of abandonment as a civil wrong in terms of current legal
doctrine both in Oregon and elsewhere. The Comment concludes that
abandonment should give rise to a civil cause of action in children against
their parents.
I. BACKGROUND: THE CHANGING LEGAL
STATUS OF CHILDREN
In early Roman law, a child was treated as a chattel of its father.5 All
interests of the child were vested in the father, who was permitted under the
doctrine ofjus vitae necisque to punish his child's misconduct as he saw
fit-even by banishment, slavery, or death.6 Eventually the law grew to
recognize property interests in the child, and later, personal interests as
well. The doctrine of jus vitae necisque was abrogated by the time of
Justinian,7 but the law continued to consider children as both property and
persons, a status similar to that of Blacks under American slavery.8
Despite this legal handicap, children were able, in both England and
America, to sue their parents for matters relating to property and, under
English common-law, for personal torts as well.9 In 1891, however, the
1. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.535 (1979).
2. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 418.015 (1979).
3. J. GOLDSTEIN. A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 32-34
(1973).
4. 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978).
5. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1916).
6. J. MUIRHEAD, LAW OF ROME 27 (3rd ed. 1916).
7. Id. at 377.
8. Comment, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 670, 739 (1978).
9. C. CAIRNS, EVERSLEY'S DOMtESTIC RELATIONS 491 (5th ed. 1937).
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Mississippi Supreme Court held that parents were immune from suit by
their children for intentional torts.10 This parental immunity doctrine was
soon adopted by other states and extended to negligence actions."
The rationale for this immunity is far from clear. Some courts state
that parental immunity prevents the danger of fraud in prosecution of stale
claims, since statutes of limitations are often tolled during the plaintiff's
minority. 2 Immunity is also said to prevent depletion of the "family
exchequer" and the possibility that the defendant-parent will succeed,
through heirship, to a cause of action against himself.13 Frequently the
parent-child relationship is analogized to that of a husband and wife, in
which suits are similarly barred. 14 Finally, it isfeared that permitting such
suits will result in interruption of domestic tranquility, intrusion into
domestic governance, or erosion of parental discipline and control.'
5
Whatever the doctrinal underpinnings of parental immunity, it
quickly spread throughout the United States. The difficulties with the
doctrine soon became manifest. Courts held that the immunity barred suit
for such abuses of parental authority as rape 16 and cruel, inhuman
treatment. 17 In an effort to relieve the harshness of such a strict rule, courts
quickly recognized a series of exceptions, permitting suits in cases in which
the child was emancipated 8 or the tort was intentional.' 9 Some courts
allowed a child to bring suit against the estate of a dead parent2 or against
a parent in his business capacity.2'
The crazy-quilt pattern of immunity resulting from these exceptions
suggests a widespread hostility to the general rule of parental immunity.
This hostility has led some courts to eschew ill-reasoned, artificial
exceptions and abrogate the immunity. In 1963, Wisconsin became the
10. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
11. See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Taubert v. Taubert, 103
Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Sorrentino v.
Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925);
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
12. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930).
16. McKelvey v. McKelvey, I1 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
17. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
18. See, e.g., Carricato v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964); Weinberg v. Underwood, 101
N.J. Super. 448,244 A.2d 538 (1968); Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769,427 P.2d 655 (1967);Tuckerv.
Tacker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W. 2d 789 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App.
2d 102,335 P.2d 736 (1959);Treschmanv. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206,61 N.E. 961 (1901); Mahuke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
20. See, e.g., Davis v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958); Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867,230 S.W.2d
610 (1950); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314,211 A.2d
410 (1965).
21. See, e.g., Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1963); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352,
150 A. 905 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst,41 Wash. 2d
642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 9 F '38 (1932).
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first state to abrogate the doctrine, retaining immunity for exercises of
parental control and authority, and for parental discretion with respect to
such matters as food and care.22 In what appears to be a trend, a number of
other states similarly have abrogated the immunity. Some, like Wisconsin,
have retained a small corner of the immunity to protect parents from suit
for reasonable exercises of their authority and discretion.23 Others have
abrogated the immunity entirely, although generally recognizing that in
applying the standard of reasonableness in a negligence action, the
24parental relationship must be considered. Similarly, in the case of an
intentional tort, parents are normally given certain privileges in dealing
with their children, such as the privilege to discipline.2 ' Thus, as to both
intentional and negligent torts, protection still is afforded the parent whose
treatment of his child, although perhaps unwise, is within the bounds of
reasonableness.
Oregon has yet to abrogate parental immunity. The Oregon courts
have recognized, however, an exception permitting suits for intentional
torts.26 The issue of the existence and scope of the immunity, therefore, did
not surface in Burnette, although it may prove fatal to a similar case in
another jurisdiction. A suit for abandonment may be maintained,
however, even in jurisdictions that retain some form of parental immunity
if the suit falls within an applicable exception, such as the intentional torts
exception utilized in Burnette or the emancipated child exception.
Abrogation or limitation of parental immunity has not only permitted
suits that previously would have been actionable absent the parental
relationship, but also has opened the door to consideration of the rights
and duties that exist because of the family relationship. These rights and
duties have received little examination in the legal literature in the short
time since parental immunity first was abrogated. A few post-immunity
cases, however, have recognized the need for definition of tort duties
existing between parent and child. In Holodook v. Spencer,27 for example,
the New York Court of Appeals, although holding that a parent's negligent
failure to supervise his child was not actionable by the child, nonetheless
treated the issue as one of first impression that, until then, had eluded
consideration due to parental immunity.
Those courts that have refused recovery for such novel tort actions
between parent and child have been motivated by considerations not
relevant to a case of abandonment. The court in Holodook feared that
permitting intrafamily suits might lead to fraud and collusion in cases in
22. Gollar v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
23. See, e.g., Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 221 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1974).
24. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 948, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965).
26. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374,397 P.2d 771 (1964); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282,218 P.2d
445 (1950).
27. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974).
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which parents were insured.28 If the parents were not insured, such suits
might destroy family harmony.29 Recognition of such a tort, together with
the New York rule of apportionment of damages between concurrent
tortfeasors, might discourage parents from prosecuting their children's
tort claims against a third party.30 Finally, the court deemed child-raising
such a difficult task that almost all parents could be said to have been
negligent in some regard. 3' The court felt that recognition of a tort action
to redress conduct so common would be ill-advised.32
These considerations, however, are not relevant in a case of
abandonment. It is doubtful that insurance would protect parents from
suit for the willful tort of abandonment, and the danger of fraud, therefore,
is minimal. Family harmony certainly will suffer no more from an
abandonment suit than it would suffer from the abandonment itself.
Abandonment is, moreover, such a radical, even criminal, departure from
the standard of parental conduct expected by society that recognition of a
tort action will impose no widespread, additional burdens on parents.
Burnette, therefore, is a unique case. It must be considered in the
context of the steadily expanding notion of the rights of children and the
relatively recent movement toward abrogation of parental immunity. It is
the first judicial examination of a child's right to enforce through a civil
action an age-old moral and criminal duty imposed on parents.
II. THE BURNETTE DECISION
Plaintiffs in Burnette were five children, aged two through eight, who
brought suit through their guardian ad litem against their mothers for
emotional injury caused by abandonment. Plaintiffs advanced four
separate theories to justify their recovery: first, that defendant's violation
of a statutory, criminal duty to support and care for their children
constituted a tort; second, that defendants had intentionally inflicted
severe emotional injury on their children; third, that defendants had
alienated the bonds of affection that normally exist between parent and
child; and, finally, that the court should recognize abandonment of
children as a common-law tort. The circuit court sustained demurrers to
the complaint and dismissed the action. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed, rejecting each of plaintiffs' theories.
Unfortunately, the factual background of the abandonments alleged
in Burnette is unavailable since the case never went to trial. This
background would have been interesting because of the light it would have
shed on the extent of plaintiffs' injuries. As the dissent noted, however, "the
28. Id. at 46, 324 N.E. 2d at 343.
29. Id. at 46, 324 N.E.2d at 344.
30. Id. at 46-47, 324 N.E.2d at 344.
31. Id. at 45-46, 324 N.E.2d at 343.
32. Id. at 45-47, 324 N.E.2d at 343-44.
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case would have been the same if a child had been deliberately abandoned
in an unheated mountain cabin and lost a limb to frostbite or suffered other
permanent injuries from lack of food or pneumonia. 33 This may overstate
the case somewhat, since it appears that plaintiffs were seeking recovery
solely for emotional injury.34 It is true, however, that the circumstances in
which the children were abandoned were irrelevant in the majority's
treatment of the case. The following analysis will accept the allegations of
the complaint as true. It should be noted, however, that this type of action
may pose substantial problems of proof, such as showing the nature and
extent of plaintiffs' emotional injuries.
III. Burnette ANALYZED: THE PLAINTIFFS' FOUR THEORIES
A. Violation of Statutory Duty
The complaint in Burnette alleged that defendants had violated four
statutes that establish minimum standards of parental care for children.35
These statutes forbid abandonment of a child, child neglect, and criminal
non-support, and impose a duty on parents to support their children.
Plaintiffs argued that violation of these statutes constituted a per se tort.
The phrase "per se tort" is legal shorthand meaning that proof of violation
of criminal statutes permits-or, in most jurisdictions, requires-a finding
of civil liability.36 The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the legislature
had established a Children's Services Division, of which the plaintiffs were
33. 284 Or. 705, 730-31, 588 P.2d 1105, 1119 n. 5 (1978) (Linde, J. dissenting).
34. The Burnette majority noted that "Although these allegations of parental failure allege lack
of support and physical care along with affectional neglect, from the allegations of injuries in the
complaint and the statements made in plaintiffs' brief, it appears that the injuries claimed are solely
emotional and psychological." Id. at 708-09, 588 P.2d at 1108.
35. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.010 (1977) provides:
Duty of Support. Parents are bound to maintain their children who are poor and unable
to work to maintain themselves; and children are bound to maintain their parents in like
circumstances.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.535 (1977) provides:
Abandonment of a Child. (1) A person commits the crime of abandonment of a child
if, being a parent, lawful guardian or other person lawfully charged with the care or custody
of a child under 15 years of age, he deserts the child in any place with intent to abandon it.
(2) Abandonment of a child is a Class C felony.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.545 (1977) provides:
Child neglect. (1) A person having custody or control of a child under 10 years of age
commits the crime of child neglect if, with criminal negligence, he leaves the child unattended
in or at any place for such period of time as may be likely to endanger the health or welfare of
such child.
(2) Child neglect is a Class A misdemeanor.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.555 (1977) provides:
Criminal Nonsupport. (1) A person commits the crime of criminal nonsupport if,
being the parent, lawful guardian or other person lawfully charged with the support of a child
under 18 years of age, born in or out of wedlock, he refuses or neglects without lawful excuse
to provide support for such child.
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a Class C felony.
36. The following courts, for instance, hold that evidence ofan unexcused violation of a criminal
statute is conclusive on the issue of negligence: Larkins v. Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 98 N.E.2d 896
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wards, and had charged it to provide "care, . . . protective ser-
vices .. .and such services for the child as the division finds to be
necessary. '37 The court interpreted these terms to include an obligation to
provide emotional nurturing, and reasoned that since the legislature had
enacted "a vast panoply of procedures, both civil and criminal, to insure
that children receive proper nurturing, support and physical care, 33 its
failure to provide specifically for a private cause of action implied that the
statutes were not intended to create civil liability.39 The court concluded:
"It is obvious that had the legislature intended a civil action it would have
provided one, as legislatures many times do."40
As authority for this point, the court cited Dean Prosser's noted
commentary on the law of torts. Prosser criticizes the rationale of many
courts that, in viewing a statute's silence on a civil remedy, purport to find
an implied intent to provide for tort liability. Prosser states: "In the
ordinary case this is pure fiction concocted for the purpose. The obvious
conclusion can only be that when the legislators said nothing about it, they
either did not have the civil suit in mind at all, or deliberately omitted to
provide for it."4 1 The Burnette court ignored the former alternative and
interpreted the legislature's silence as a conscious refusal to establish a civil
action. It is at least as reasonable to infer, however, that the Oregon
legislators, accustomed to the bar of parental immunity, simply did not
consider the possibility of a civil suit.
42
The Burnette court's citation of Prosser is misleading since the court
fails to employ his analysis. Although Prosser questions the reasoning of
courts that impose civil liability on the basis of criminal legislation, he
concludes: "Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation is that courts are
seeking, by something in the nature of judicial legislation, to further the
ultimate policy for the protection of individuals which they find underlying
the statute, and which they believe the legislature must have had in
mind. 43 Rather than seeking to divine the intention of the legislature,
(1951); Hardaway v. Consolidated Paper Co., 366 Mich. 190, 114 N.W.2d 236 (1962); Martin v.
Hertog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920); White v. Gore, 201 Va. 239, 110 S.E.2d 228 (1959).
A minority of courts hold that such a violation is only evidence of negligence. See, e.g.,
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Novick Transfer Co., 274 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1960) (applying Maryland law);
Gill v. Whiteside-Hemby Drug Co., 197 Ark. 425, 122 S.W.2d 597 (1939); Guinan v. Famous Players-
Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N.E. 235 (1929); Chiapparine v. Public Service R. Co., 91 N.J.L. 581,
103 A. 180 (1918).
37. 284 Or. at 710, 588 P.2d at 1108, citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 418.015 (1977).
38. 284 Or. at 710, 588 P.2d at 1108.
39. Id. at 710, 588 P.2d at 1109.
40. Id.
41. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 191 (4th ed. 1971).
42. One of the statutes alleged to have been violated in Burnette was enacted prior to
recognition, in 1950, of an exception to parental immunity permitting suits for intentional torts. That
statute is OR. REV. STAT. § 109.010 (1977) imposing a duty of support on parents. The three criminal
statutes, supra note 35, were enacted in 1971. 1971 OR. LAWS c. 743 §§ 173-75. Given the lack of
precedent for recognition of a civil action for abandonment, it is likely that, when they enacted these
criminal statutes, the Oregon legislators did not consider the impact of the 1950 decision limiting
immunity to a case of abandonment.
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 41, § 36, at 191.
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Prosser would look to criminal legislation as a source of tort liability
whenever the criminal statute is designed to protect the class of persons in
which the plaintiff is included against the risk of the type of harm that in
fact occurred. 44 This approach is similar to that taken by most courts,
45
46including the Oregon court on previous occasions.
On the basis of Prosser's two-pronged analysis, the Burnette court
could have held that violation of the four Oregon statutes regulating child
care gives rise to tort liability. It is clear that the plaintiffs were in the class
of persons intended to be protected. It is not as clear, however, whether the
statutes seek to protect children from emotional injury. Physical injury
may be the most obvious consequence of abandonment, but it is by no
means the only one. Emotional injury is so common among abandoned
children 48 that it is reasonable to conclude that the statutes sought to
prevent emotional as well as physical injury.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts approaches the issue of violation
of a statutory duty differently than Prosser, but arguably dictates the same
result. Section 874A of the Restatement provides:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or
requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the
violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in
furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the
effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right
of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action
analogous to an existing tort action.49
The comments to this Restatement provision indicate that, when faced
with a criminal statute silent on the matter of civil responsibility, courts
first should determine whether the legislature in fact had some specific, yet
unexpressed, intention regarding civil liability. If so, that intention must
govern. But if, as is most probable here, the legislature's silence indicates
that it had no specific intention, the court must make a policy decision and
provide the remedy sought if it is "consistent with the legislative provision,
appropriate for promoting its policy and needed to assure its effec-
tiveness."5 The Restatement suggests that it is appropriate, in this regard,
for a court to consider the following: The nature of the legislative
provision; the adequacy of existing remedies; the significance of the
44. Id. at 200.
45. See, e.g., Alsakerv. De GraffLumberCo., 234 Minn. 280,48 N.W.2d431(1951); De Haenv.
Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 N.Y. 350, 179 N.E. 764(1932); Hutto v. Southern R. Co., 100 S.C. 181,
84 S.E. 719 (1915); Kalkopf v. Donald Sales & Mfg. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 247, 147 N.W.2d 277 (1967);
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453 (1923).
46. See, e.g., Cutsforth v. Kunsa, 267 Or. 423, 517 P.2d 640 (1973).
47. 1 accept the Burnette majority's assertion that the alleged injuries were solely emotional. See
note 34, supra.
48. See, e.g.. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 34.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).
50. Id., comment d.
51. Id., comment h.
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purpose that the legislative body is seeking to effectuate; the extent of the
resultant change in the tort law; the burden that the new cause of action
will place on the courts; and the extent to which the tort action will
supplement or interfere with existing remedies and means of enforce-
52
ment.
Judged by these standards, the Oregon statutes probably should have
been held to create a tort action. Specific, narrowly-drawn criminal
statutes are the most appropriate statutory source of implied civil actions.
Unlike a constitutional provision, which may be intended only as a broad
statement of policy, these statutes precisely define a standard of conduct to
which all must adhere. It is reasonable, therefore, to hold those who breach
this standard of conduct liable civilly as well as criminally. Criminal
liability alone will not redress adequately the injury caused by
abandonment since the existing criminal remedies do nothing to
recompense the child, even though his injuries may be quite severe.53 The
goal of preventing and remedying these injuries is vital, for they may
permanently damage the child54 and, ultimately, society as well.55
Recognition of a tort action, as sought by plaintiffs in Burnette, would
effect a change in the tort law, but the change would be far from drastic. No
case in Oregon or elsewhere has ever decided whether parents owe their
children a civil duty of support; such cases were seldom brought while
parental immunity remained a bar to intra-family suits. Recognition,
therefore, does not require that precedent be overruled, only that it be
expanded upon by legal enforcement of a longstanding moral duty.56
Moreover, recognition would not unduly burden the courts. Precise sta-
tistics are unavailable, but it is a safe bet that abandonment is much less
common than other occurrences that currently give rise to tort actions,
such as negligent driving or battery.
The court in Burnette did not follow the Restatement analysis, but it
did express great concern with one of the Restatement's considerations:
the extent to which establishing a civil action for damages would interfere
with the legislative scheme. In particular, the court feared incursion into
what it found to be a general theme running throughout the Oregon
Juvenile Code; namely, that children are to be provided for in their natural
homes whenever possible. When this is not possible, a means is provided
for divesting the parents of their rights and removing the children from
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 34.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. It may be argued that when a court holds an action barred by parental immunity, it implicitly
holds that defendant owes no duty to plaintiff-that is, that immunity negates duty. It is more accurate,
,however, to consider the immunity as preventing enforcement of any duty that defendant may owe
plaintiff. As Prosser expresses it: "[l]mmunity does not mean that conduct which would amount to a
tort on the part of other defendants is not still equally tortious in character, but merely that for the
protection of the particular defendant, or of interests which he represents, he is given absolution from
liability." W. PROSSER, supra note 41, at 970.
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their natural family. The court in Burnette believed that "tort actions such
as the present ones might well be destructive of any plans the social
agencies and juvenile court might have for these children.""
Although it is indeed a policy of the Oregon statutes to keep children
in their natural homes whenever possible, recognition of a tort action need
not be destructive of this policy. The complaint in this case alleged that the
plaintiff children had been abandoned and deserted by their parents
"maliciously, intentionally, and with cruel disregard of the conse-
quences."58 Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that these children
could ever be reunited with their natural families. Moreover, by enacting
criminal statutes preventing such desertions, the legislature may be said to
have abandoned any hope of reconciliation in such cases. Any conflict
could be eliminated by requiring that children be removed from their fam-
ily before beginning a civil action. The Burnette court found it "signifi-
cant" that the complaint failed to allege that defendants' parental rights
had been terminated, 59 but this appears not to have been crucial. In any
case, it should not have been. The very nature of a claim for abandonment
suggests that the parental relationship has ceased to exist in fact, if not in
law.
Criminal statutes are most often applied to tort actions in negligence
cases. They are considered, in that context, to be a legislative definition of
the requisite standard of care. Indeed, Prosser appears not to have
considered the application of a statutory duty to intentional torts.60 It is a
mistake, however, to confine this doctrine to negligence cases. The
Restatement position clearly is not so limited.61 There are few cases,
however, applying criminal statutes to actions for intentional torts. The
relative paucity of such cases is explained by the distinctive character of
Burnette. Most intentional torts, like battery, derive from a duty that was
long recognized in both civil and criminal law. Some, like intentional
infliction of emotional distress, impose a duty that evolved slowly, often
finding expression first in a civil action. In contrast, the duty at issue in
Burnette has been recognized both criminally and morally for thousands
of years, but, until recently, civil suits have been barred by parental
immunity.
In those states that have abrogated or limited parental immunity, the
question becomes whether this venerable duty should be recognized by the
civil as well as the criminal law. The criteria proposed by both Prosser and
the Restatement suggest that it should be. Refusal to permit tort recovery
57. 284 Or. at 714, 588 P.2d at 1108.
58. Id. at 708, 588 P.2d at 1107.
59. Id. at 714, 588 P.2d at 1110.
60. See, W. PROSSER, supra note 41, § 36, at 190.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286-88C (1965) deal with when a court may adopt the
requirements of a legislative enactment as the standard of conduct of a reasonable person in a
negligence action. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979) (when a court may recognize a
cause of action based on violation of a statute).
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in an abandonment case is to ignore the emphasis our society places on a
parent's duty to her child-an emphasis reflected in the criminal statutes.
The dissent in Burnette expressed the relationship between criminal and
civil duties of support in these terms:
Jurisprudentially it might be said that parents have a duty not to abandon and
desert their young children because ORS 163.535 makes it a crime to do so,
but a legislator would surely think ORS 163.535 should make it a crime to
abandon and desert a child because the parent's existing duty-the duty to the
child, not to the state-deserved governmental reenforcement. It is the
parent's duty thus recognized under Oregon law that plaintiffs invoke in these
cases.
62
The majority opinion in Burnette purported to scrupulously apply
established tort doctrine and defer to the expressed will of the legislature,
but it actually twisted or ignored both. Traditional legal doctrine permits,
if it does not require, recognition of a tort action for abandonment on the
basis of Oregon's criminal statutes. The silence of the legislature should not
be interpreted as hostility to a tort action, for the moving force behind the
Oregon child care statutes and similar statutory schemes in other states is
an appreciation of the damage caused by abandonment. This damage
cannot be remedied adequately by criminal sanctions alone. Imposition of
civil liability, therefore, would be appropriate.
B. Alienation of Affections
Alienation of affections is a tort that seeks to protect a person's
interest in the family relationship. Traditionally, the essence of the tort was
an impairment of the marital relation by depriving the plaintiff of his
spouse's affections, including love, society, companionship, and comfort.63
64It is most generally brought against a meddling parent or lover. This tort
was recognized as early as 1866 by New York,65 and was ultimately
adopted at common law by every state except Louisiana.66
Alienation of affections and other torts that seek to protect such
relational interests evolved from an ancient common-law action for
enticing away a servant, thereby depriving the master of a quasi-
proprietary interest in the servant's services.67 Damages could be recovered
only for loss of services, even in the context of a family relationship.
Gradually, however, the law came to recognize the legitimacy of interests
in companionship and affection as well. In some jurisdictions these
62. 284 Or. at 728-29, 588 P.2d at 1118 (Linde, J. dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170, 180 P. 91 (1919); Hudima v. Hudima, 131
Conn. 281, 39 A.2d 890 (1944); Johnson v. Richards, 50 Idaho 150,294 P. 507 (1930); Annarina v.
Boland, 136 Md. 365, 11 A. 84 (1920); Grobart v. Grobart, 5 N.J. 161, 74 A.2d 294 (1950).
64. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170, 180 P. 91 (1919); Hudima v. Hudima, 131
Conn. 281, 39 A.2d 890 (1944); Annarina v. Boland, 136 Md. 365, 11 A. 84 (1920).
65. See Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. 1866).
66. See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927).
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 41, § 124, at 873.
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interests have come to overshadow or replace the original interest in
services.6S
The common law permitted only the husband to maintain an action
for alienation of affections. The wife was afforded no such protection, in
part because she lacked capacity to sue in her own behalf. The common law
also reflected the prevailing belief that women were not entitled to any
services from their husbands and could not, therefore, recover for the loss
of such services.6 9 As society's conception of women and marriage
changed, so did the law; today in almost all states a wife may recover for
alienation of affections.70
Courts have recently begun to consider the question whether children
may recover against one who has alienated the affections of a parent.
Fifteen courts have refused to recognize such a cause of action.71 Two more
courts have held such suits barred by so-called "heart-balm" statutes,72
which prohibit actions alleging sexual misbehavior-such as criminal
conversation, seduction, and alienation of affections-on the premise that
these types of actions are unduly susceptible to abuses such as threatening
suit with concomitant publicity in order to force an unjust settlement.73
Only four courts have allowed children to recover for alienation of a
parent's affection. 74 Oregon has not yet ruled on this question.
Even in those states that allow to children a cause of action for
alienation of affections, a conceptual leap is required to apply it to
abandonment situations. In those cases that have permitted children to
recover, the children sued third persons who allegedly had enticed their
parents away from the family, thus depriving the children of the services,
companionship, and affection due them.75 In Burnette the children sought
to recover from the abandoning parents themselves. Plaintiffs thus sought
an expansion of the doctrine beyond that presently recognized by any
68. Holbrook, The Change in the MeaningofConsortium,22 MICH. L. REV. 1(1923); Lippman,
The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoL. L. REV. 651 (1930).
69. Holbrook, supra note 68.
70. Id. Maine has construed its statute to prohibit suits by the wife for alienation of affections.
Farrell v. Farrell, 118 Me. 441, 108 A. 648 (1920); Howard v. Howard, 120 Me. 479, 115 A. 259 (1921).
71. See Edler v. MacAlpine-Downie, 180 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Brookleyv. Ranson, 376 F.
Supp. 195 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Lucas v. Bishop, 224 Ark. 353, 273 S.W.2d 397 (1955); Coulter v.
Coulter, 73 Colo. 144,214 P. 400 (1923) (Plaintiffwas adult child); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56
A.2d 768 (1947); Whitcomb v. Huffington, 180 Kan. 340,304 P.2d 465 (1956); Cole v. Cole, 277 Mass.
50, 177 N.E. 810 (1931); Kleinow v. Ameika, 19 N.J. Super 523, 88 A.2d 31 (1952); Morrow v.
Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134,273 N.Y.S. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Roth v. Parsons, 16 N.C. App. 646, 192
S.E.2d 659 (1972); Kane v. Quigley, I Ohio St. 2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 338 (1964); Nash v. Baker, 522 P.2d
1335 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948); Wallacev. Wallace,
155 W. Va. 569, 184 S.E. 327 (1971); Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953).
72. See Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454,190 P.2d 984(1948); Katzv. Katz, 197 Misc. 412,
95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
73. W. PROSSER, supra note 41, § 124, at 887.
74. See Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174(7th Cir. 1945) (applying Illinois law); Russickv. Hicks, 85
F. Supp. 281 (W. D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Il1. App. 598,71 N.E.2d 810 (1947); Miller
v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
75. See note 74 supra.
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court. Although recognizing the lack of precedent for this application of
the alienation of affections doctrine, plaintiffs argued that "it would be
anomalous to recognize a right to recover as against a third party, but
refuse to enforce a right where the fault is greater-against the deserting
parent himself.,
76
The doctrine of alienation of affections has undergone a profound
transformation since its appearance in the early common law, and it may
well be anachronistic in our society in which divorce is increasingly
commonplace. It is certainly "anomolous," as plaintiffs said, to allow a
man's wife and children to recover damages for loss of his affections from a
third-party temptress and yet deny recovery for the same injuries when the
husband acts without outside encouragement. Perhaps a person's interest
in the continued love, society, companionship, and comfort of a spouse or
parent can best be dealt with in actions for divorce, child support, or even
abandonment, brought against the family member himself. But stretching
the old and probably outmoded doctrine of alienation of affections to fit
abandonment cases is like pounding a nail with a wrench. It will damage
the doctrine without accomplishing the desired end.
The alienation of affections doctrine certainly does have some
relevance to a case of abandonment. In applying the doctrine to children,
courts have determined that a child's relationship with his parents should
be a legally-protected interest. As one court said in allowing a child recov-
ery for alienation of affections:
Defendant's conduct resulted in the destruction of the children's family
unit-that fortress within which they should find comfort and protection at
least until they reach maturity-and deprived them of the unstinting financial
support heretofore contributed by their father, as well as the security afforded
by his affection and presence. . . . [T]he minor children herein have a right
to protect their relationship with their parents and are properly entitled to
seek damages from one who has destroyed their family unit.
77
The court quoted above expressed concern for the children's interest
in their father's earnings, an interest not implicated in Burnette, but the
court clearly seeks to protect other interests as well, particularly the
children's right to their parents' love and moral support. If children's
interest in their family relationship is sufficient to permit recovery from a
stranger who has interfered with that relationship, then it should also be
sufficient to permit recovery from a parent who has destroyed that
relationship. The alienation of affections cases cited by plaintiffs are clearly
distinguishable from Burnette, but the reasoning underlying them does
support a crucial premise of the plaintiffs' case: a child's legal interest in his
parental relationship deserves legal protection.
76. Appellant's Brief and Abstract of Record at 16-17, Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705,588 P.2d
1105 (1978).
77. Johnson v. Luhman, 330 111. App. 598, 606-07, 71 N.E.2d 810, 814 (1947).
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C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The early common law afforded no independent protection to a
person's interest in peace of mind. Damages for infliction of emotional
distress could be recovered only if a defendant's conduct constituted some
independent tort, such as assault,7 8 battery,79 false imprisonment, ° or
seduction.8" Wilkinson v. Downton,82 an English case decided in 1897, is
generally considered a watershed in this area of the law. In Wilkinson, a
practical joker told plaintiff that her husband had broken both his legs in
an accident and was lying in a public house in need of assistance. The court
held the defendant liable for the plaintiff's resulting emotional injury.83 By
the middle of this century, American courts generally had come to
recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional harm, a
doctrine that proved remarkably flexible. Liability has been found for such
disparate wrongs as spreading a false rumor that plaintiff's son had hanged
himself;8 4 bringing a mob to plaintiff's door at night with a threat to lynch
him; 5 and wrapping and delivering a dead rat instead of a loaf of bread to a
person who obviously expected the latter.
86
The Restatement of Torts initially refused to recognize the existence
of such a tort.87 In 1948, however, the editors reversed themselves by
recognizing the tort with few limits.8 8 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
retained the general doctrine, but limited its scope. The revised
formulation was adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Pakos v.
Clark:89 "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress..."90
There are basically three separate elements in this articulation of the
tort: the defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous; he must act
intentionally or recklessly; and severe emotional distress must result. All
three of these elements are satisfied when a parent abandons his child.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" is an imprecise standard. It is
intended to be a general statement of principles, not a litmus paper test.
78. See, e.g., Klien v. Klien, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902).
79. See, e.g., Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N.W. 527 (1884).
80. See, e.g., Godsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925).
81. See, e.g., Anthony v. Norton, 60 Kan. 341, 56 P. 529 (1899).
82. 2 Q.B. 57 (1897).
83. Id. at 59.
84. Bielitski v. Obadiak, 61 Dom. L. Rep. 494 (Can. 1921).
85. Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930).
86. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
87. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934).
88. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948) provides: "One who, without a privilege to do so,
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b)
for bodily harm resulting from it."
89. 253 Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969).
90. Il. at 122, 453 P.2d at 686 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 46(1) (1965)).
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Some insight into the meaning of the phrase can be gained from an
examination of the American cases that impose liability. The holdings of
these cases have been summarized in the comment to section 46 of the
Restatement, which provides:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" 9
The Oregon Supreme Court found this statement to be imprecise and
contradictory and proposed a simpler, though arguably no more precise,
test in Rockhill v. Pollard:92 the defendant's conduct must be "outrageous
in the extreme. 93
Rockhill contains a far more significant contribution, however. The
court held a physician liable for ejecting plaintiff and her obviously
injured, 10-month old baby from his office in the dead of winter, without
adequate treatment. Such conduct was "outrageous in the extreme," the
court concluded, in part because of the relationship of the parties-a
physician may be held to a stricter standard of conduct toward his patients
than a layman would be toward a stranger.
Similarly, in judging a child's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, courts should demand more from parents than from
strangers. Conduct that merely is insensitive when engaged in by a stranger
may become extreme and outrageous if done by a parent. It is not
necessary to recite a paean to motherhood to assert that the relation of
mother to child is among the most sacred in our society, a status indicative
of its importance. Any abandonment of a child threatens physical harm,
but when a child is abandoned by his mother, the chances are greatly
increased that severe emotional injury will result. The emotional injury
may be more serious than its physical counterpart; it may result even
though the child's physical needs are met. In any case, it may manifest itself
long after the physical effects of abandonment have disappeared.94
If the facts alleged in Burnette are not outrageous, it is difficult to
imagine what would be. The Burnette court refused to allow recovery,
fearing that such a precedent would prove difficult to contain. 95 A recovery
in Burnette, the court asserted, would permit a child to recover damages
when its parents divorce thereby causing the child emotional injury.96
Divorce clearly is qualitatively different from abandonment, and liability
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965).
92. 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971).
93. Id. at 60, 485 P.2d at 31.
94. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 3.




in such a case could be avoided by holding it to be not "outrageous."
Indeed, the recent increase in the incidence of divorce in our society, cited
by the majority, itself is evidence that divorce is no longer considered
"utterly intolerable in a civilized community., 97
Parents who desert their children may not intend specifically to injure
them. Such parents, however, do act in deliberate disregard of a high
probability that their children will suffer emotional distress. This disregard
is sufficient to satisfy the Restatement definition of recklessness, 98 and
meets the second of the three elements of the tort.
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
some states require plaintiff to prove physical as well as emotional injury.99
Once physical injury is shown, however, recovery is permitted for both
physical and emotional damage.100 Those courts that require physical
injury probably do so to discourage fraudulent claims. They consider
physical harm to be independent evidence of the claimed emotional
damage. It is not surprising, therefore, that these courts often find the
physical injury requirement met by a relatively minor physical manifesta-
tion.
There is some danger of fraudulent claims when emotional injury
alone is held compensable. Such emotional injury is typically proved solely
through plaintiff's testimony. To require physical injury as an absolute
condition for recovery, however, is an example of judicial overkill. Such a
requirement results in an arbitrary denial of recovery to the class of
emotionally damaged plaintiffs who, luckily or unluckily, avoided physical
injury. Prosser suggests that when physical injury is lacking, the courts
properly may require a greater showing of outrageous conduct; the more
outrageous the conduct, the more believable the plaintiff's claim of
emotional injury.'01
Section 46 of the Restatement permits recovery for "emotional
distress" even in the absence of physical injury. Indeed, recovery is
permitted for a wide range of emotional ailments, as indicated by the
comments to section 46:
The rule stated in the Section applies only where the emotional distress has in
fact resulted, and where it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various
names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or
the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright,
horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disap-
pointment, worry and nausea.'0 2
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d (1965).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
99. See, e.g., Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Kirby v. Jules
Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 13-5
P.2d 330 (1943); Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954); Harned v. E-Z
Finance Co.. 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
100. See, e.g., cases cited in note 99 supra.
101. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 53 (1956).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment j (1965).
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This definition of "emotional distress" should be adequate, in a typical
case, to recompense a child for the variety of emotional disturbances
caused by abandonment.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a relatively
recent growth in the law. It is difficult to determine what will be the limits of
this growth, but the tort clearly appears to reach the conduct alleged in
Burnette. Indeed, the defendants' conduct is more reprehensible and the
plaintiffs' injuries more serious in Burnette than in many previous cases in
which liability has been found. Certainly a parent who abandons her
children is more despicable than a practical joker, even one with a taste for
the macabre. The momentary upset suffered by one who unexpectedly
discovers a dead rat in her groceries pales in comparison to the trauma
suffered by an abandoned child. Thus, the court in Burnette should have
held that the complaint stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
D. Common-Law Tort
No case in any jurisdiction has been found recognizing a tort for
parental desertion, either as a common-law tort or under one of the other
theories advanced by the plaintiffs in Burnette. Such suits traditionally
have been barred by parental immunity. Only recently, as this immunity
has been limited or abrogated, have courts begun to consider the
substantive issue of the rights and duties that exist because of the family
relationship. Indeed, no case other than Burnette has reached the question
whether parents owe their children a civil duty to provide care.103 To
recognize a civil action for abandonment, therefore, a court must be
willing to break new legal ground-something courts notoriously have
been hesitant to do. The scant attention this issue has received, however,
suggests that the common law of abandonment is worthy of reconsidera-
tion and ripe for change.
Change is sometimes regarded as anathematic to the common law,
but the common law is not, and should not be, static. As our society
changes, the law must change as well. Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court
has itself expressed similar sentiments: "This court has not felt unduly
restricted by the boundaries of pre-existing common-law remedies. We
have not hesitated to create or recognize new torts when confronted with
conduct causing injuries which we feel should be compensated. '0 4
Why, then, did the court in Burnette refuse to recognize a tort of
abandonment? One answer certainly is found in the traditional hesitancy
of courts to intrude in family relationships. This hesitancy was responsible,
in part at least, for the development of intra-family immunities and
103. But see Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 355, 150 A. 905,906 (1930) ("Cases of mere non-
feasance as to the performance of moral duties of support, etc., are not in point here. There is no
liability because there has been no breach of legal duty.") (dictum).
104. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 215, 536 P.2d 512, 514 (1975).
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remains a useful policy in some cases today. Some aspects of the family
relationship clearly deserve judicial deference. Parents certainly should be
given wide latitude in raising their children-determining when and how to
discipline them, regulating their conduct, and supervising their education.
The law should impose no liability on parents for good-faith errors of
judgment in performing these parental functions. '05 But courts should not
refuse, and have not refused, to question all manner of parental conduct.
The recent trend toward abrogation of parental immunity indicates
an increasing willingness on the part of courts to allow tort claims in cases
in which the damage to the family is minimal and the essence of the tort is
unrelated to the exercise of parental discretion. Thus, for instance, courts
have created exceptions to the immunity doctrine in cases in which the
child is emancipated, or the suit is against the estate of a dead parent or
against a parent in his business capacity. 10 6 In the first two cases the family
relationship has, in a sense, ceased to exist. In the latter case, the probable
existence of insurance makes it unlikely that a suit would interfere with the
family. Some courts have created an exception to parental immunity for
suits based on intentional torts.0 7 Others, in abrogating the immunity,
have continued to bar suit for reasonable exercises of parental authority
and discretion.'0 8 Both approaches are founded on a deference to exercises
of parental discretion.
The considerations that counsel such deference are inapplicable when
a child brings suit for abandonment. Abandonment of a child results in the
utter destruction of the family relationship; permitting the child to bring
suit for the abandonment cannot further damage the relationship. As the
Burnette dissent noted, "the parents have in fact ended the family unit, so
that solicitude about not impairing it by litigation may sacrifice the
children's legal rights to a pious hope."'0 9 Abandonment is no mere
exercise of parental discretion nor error of parental judgment. Rather, it is
a complete abdication of responsibility for the child. A person who has
thus turned his back on his parental duties should not be permitted to
invoke his parental status to shield himself from tort liability.
Abandonment is thought to cause a wide range of emotional
problems in children. In children from birth to 18 months, any separation
from the mother, even for the short period when the baby is put in the care
of a babysitter, can lead to food refusals, digestive upsets, sleeping
difficulties, and crying.'10 In children under five, abandonment may
produce distress, anxiety, and a profound diminution in the quality of their
next attachments. Children abandoned at this age often grow up as
105. See, e.g., Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 221 N.W.2d 659 (Minn. 1974).
106. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
107. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
109. 284 Or. at 729, 588 P.2d at 1118 (Linde, J. dissenting).
110. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 32.
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persons unable to maintain warm contacts with others. They have been
known to suffer regressions in their toilet training and a loss or lessening of
their ability to communicate verbally."1 When parents abandon school-
age children, the children may respond by abandoning their parents'
demands, prohibitions, and social ideals. This response may, in turn, result
in antisocial, delinquent, or even criminal behavior." 2 The effects of
abandonment are most difficult to see in adolescents, but may include
interference with the establishment of the child's independent adult
identity.' 13 Perhaps the most disheartening result of abandonment is that
adults who were themselves abandoned may treat their own children no
better.' 14 Thus, the sins of the fathers are visited on the sons.
The real debate in Burnette, however, is not over the damage caused
by abandonment, but rather, over the best way to remedy that damage. Is
the imposition of civil liability the best way to deal with the problem of
abandonment? It is possible that the potential for civil liability would act as
a deterrent, but this argument is not particularly persuasive. When parents
abandon their child, they violate one of the oldest and most cherished
precepts of our society. It is doubtful, therefore, that the possibility of civil
liability will be effective in restraining such parents.
Another argument for imposition of civil liability is based on the
Oregon Constitution, which contains a provision similar to provisions
found in the constitutions of many states: "[E]very man shall have remedy
by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property, or
reputation.""' 5 This provision, however, cannot reasonably be read to
mean that every injury must be remedied. Many injuries are not, and
should not, be recognized by the law. If the provision is read to mean only
that all injuries recognized as such by the law must be remedied, it does no
more than state a facet of due process doctrine.
This constitutional provision is a slender reed on which to base tort
liability, but it does state, perhaps too broadly, an important tenet of tort
law. Culpable conduct causing injury to another, if not protected by
privilege, defense or immunity, should give rise to tort liability. A wrong
should not go unremedied merely because it is not within the definition of
any previously recognizable cause of action. Section 870 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects this principle. It provides: "One
who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the other
for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under
the circumstances. This liability may be imposed although the actor's




I11. Id. at 33.
112. Id. at 33-34. See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
113. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 34.
114. Id.
115. OR. CONST. art. I, § 10.
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979).
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The generality of this provision may detract from its persuasive value, but
the principle underlying section 870 certainly warrants consideration in the
case of abandonment.
Aside from the general concept that wrongs such as abandonment
should be righted, there "are several more narrow considerations urging
recognition of a civil cause of action for abandonment. The criminal law
can be effective in protecting the rights of children only if the authorities
are willing to invoke it. Friends or relatives of the children or the children
themselves may recommend criminal action to the local prosecutor, but
the ultimate decision to prosecute is not in their hands. Criminal
prosecutions not only require a higher degree of proof than their civil
counterparts, but they often demand proof of something more than just
desertion. Many states, including Oregon, define abandonment in terms of
the parent's intent. " 7 A parent may desert the child for a time and yet incur
no criminal liability-despite the damage caused his child." 8 In sum, when
no civil action for abandonment is permitted, the child has no independent
means of enforcing his right to parental love and care. Indeed, in the
absence of a means of enforcing such a right, it is probably meaningless to
assert that any right exists. The child is then left without his parents and
without any civil remedy, while an action against the parents may be
brought, if at all, only at the discretion of the state. There is no one to speak
for the child.
In its present state, the law draws arbitrary distinctions between those
injuries to a child that are compensable and those that are not. In most
states, for instance, a child may recover against his parents for battery." 9 If
the child is abandoned, the wrong may be more grievous, the harm more
severe, and yet the child is denied recovery. Even broken bones may heal in
time, but the emotional damage caused by abandonment may never heal,
even if the child is later placed in a foster or adoptive family.
20
Moreover, the interests asserted by plaintiffs in Burnette have been
deemed worthy of legal protection in other contexts. For instance, an
increasing number of states permit children, as plaintiffs in wrongful death
actions, to recover non-pecuniary losses such as lost society and com-
panionship, mental anguish, grief and sorrow.' 2 1 Similarly, a few juris-
dictions permit children to recover non-pecuniary damages in actions
for alienation of affections. 22 Courts have thus recognized the legitimacy
117. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.535 (1977) and In re Welfare of Staat, 287 Minn. 501,178 N.W.2d 709
(1970). Contra, Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W. 2d 796 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1966).
118. See notes 110-14 and accompanying text supra.
119. Parents, of course, may discipline theirchild by corporal punishment, but if the punishment
exceeds that which is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, the child may recover for the
battery. See, e.g.. Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575,36 A.2d 377 (1944); State v. Vanderbilt, 116
Ind. II. IS N.E. 266 (18S8); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903).
120. GOLoSTEIN, supra note 3. at 22-26.
121. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, § 3.1 (2d ed. 1975). Oregon, however, does
not permit recovery for such non-pecuniary losses. Scott v. Brogani, 157 Or. 549, 73 P.2d 688 (1937).
122. See note 74 supra.
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of a child's interest in the continuation of his family relationship. The
argument for legal protection of that interest is certainly no less compelling
in a case of abandonment than in a case of wrongful death or alienation of
affections. The defendant in a wrongful death action may have been
unaware that his victim had children, and yet he is held liable for
interference with the parent-child relationship. An abandoning parent, on
the other hand, knowingly ends that relationship and yet escapes civil
liability.
The case for recognition of a civil action for abandonment is stated
most succinctly by Henry Foster and Doris Freed in an essay entitled, "A
Bill of Rights for Children."' 23 They write: "A child has a moral right and
should have a legal right: 1. To receive parental love and affection,
discipline and guidance, and to grow to maturity in a home environment
which enables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult . . .,124
It is fitting that the authors chose to express this right first, for the right to
love and nurturing is of paramount importance. The overwhelming
importance of this right demands that the law afford redress for its denial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in Burnette, but their complaint arguably
stated a cause of action both for a tort arising from violation of a criminal
statute and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, as a
policy matter, plaintiffs stated a strong case for recognition of a new tort of
parental abandonment. In denying recovery, the Oregon Supreme Court
may have been reacting to the novelty of the cause asserted. As states
continue to abrogate or limit parental immunity, more such suits will likely
be brought, forcing wider consideration of the issues raised by Burnette
and perhaps resulting in recognition of a civil cause of action for
abandonment.
Robert M. Pfeiffer
123. Henry H. Foster, Jr. and Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, in THE
YOUNGEST MINORITY (S. Katz ed. 1974).
124. Id. at 318.
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